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    The years following World War One belonged to a crisis period when political 
extremities strengthened throughout Europe. In Hungary, it was also the peak of the radical right wing, and some 
radical political circles even planned coups d’état against the conservative government that was working on the 
political consolidation of Hungary. A group of radical right-wing politicians led by Member of the Parliament Ferenc 
Ulain who had been in confidential contact with German radical right-wing movements and politicians (Adolf Hitler 
and General Erich Ludendorff among them) decided to execute a takeover attempt in 1923, with the help of Bavarian 
paramilitary movements, harmonizing their plans with the Munich Beer Hall Putsch being in preparation. The present 
research article makes an attempt to reconstruct this strange chapter of Hungarian political history. 
 
 Although domestic policy of Hungary was fully determined by British and French interests 
after the signing of the Peace Treaty of Trianon, secret negotiations with radical right-wing 
German and Austrian organizations, which went back to 1919, continued for a time in 1921 and 
1922 with less intensity than before. The Bethlen Government continued to maintain moderate 
contacts with German radical right-wing politicians, including former Bavarian Premier and later 
Commissioner General Gustav von Kahr, General Erich Ludendorff and Adolf Hitler, who was 
then an emerging and very ambitious young far-right politician in Munich, the centre of the 
German radical right-wing movements.  In the spring of 1922, Prime Minister Bethlen sent the 
influential politician Miklós Kozma, then the director of the Hungarian Telegraph Office to 
Munich to negotiate and gather information and to revive Bavarian-Hungarian political relations, 
which had been declining since the end of 1921.
1
 Kozma also personally negotiated with General 
Ludendorff, a leader of the German radical right about a possible Bavarian-Hungarian cooperation 
initiative, in which the Hungarian Government circles would have bought weapons from 
Germany, for example. The German general complained to him that his political influence had 
recently declined considerably within the Weimar Republic, and even within Bavaria, the centre of 
the radical right, and that there was such a great disunity among Bavarian right-wing politicians 
that they essentially did not agree with each other on anything.
2
 Bethlen, informed by Miklós 
Kozma and Gyula Gömbös, chairman of the Hungarian Defence Force Association (MOVE) and 
a prominent politician of the Hungarian radical right (who was then still a member of the 
governing party), concluded that the Hungarian Government could not hope for any useful 
cooperation with the Bavarians, and negotiations on such cooperation were temporarily 
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suspended.
3
 Behind the negotiations, the name of the then very influential secret military 
organization, the Double Cross Blood Union was involved, since among others, Colonel Tihamér 
Siménfalvy, the head of the organisation was one of the influential figures on the Hungarian 
Government side who had previously encouraged the maintenance of lively relations with the 
Bavarian and Austrian far-right movements.
4
 
As we have mentioned, from 1922 onwards, Bethlen’s consolidation policy led to a decline 
in attempts of cooperation between the Hungarian Government and the German-Austrian far-right 
organizations. At the same time, the nationalist-irredentist organizations, which were increasingly 
opposed to the Hungarian government, though sometimes united with it in common interests, 
especially the then still influential Association of Awakening Hungarians which had considerable 
political influence and a large number of members, and the radical circles of military officers that 
were also part of its leadership, continued to actively seek international cooperation with 
organizations on a similar ideological platform. In 1921 the Awakening Hungarians represented 
the Hungarian radical right in the international anti-Semitic congress in Vienna where the 
possibility of forming an International Anti-Semitic League was raised.
5
 
The first years of consolidation continued to be characterized by a social and economic 
situation that was very favourable of political extremism. Several political groupings also played 
on the idea of attempted coups and violent takeovers. The failed revisionist right-wing alliance, the 
White Internationale dreamed up by Ludendorff was the predecessor of such an adventurous and 
essentially frivolous coup plan, which nevertheless attracted great political and press attention, and 
was put forward by Dr. Béla Szemere, a surgeon and hospital director, the used-to-be commander 
of the auxiliary police militia known as the National Organisation of State Security Agents 
(Állambiztonsági Megbízottak Szervezete, shortened as ÁBM) (by then under the control of the 
National Labour Protection, a right-wing workers’ militia under the supervision of the State 
Police), Hungarian-born American architect Titusz Bobula, and Dr. Ferenc Ulain, a lawyer and 
race-defending member of the National Assembly who had left the governing United Party and 
was the confidant of Gyula Gömbös, the leading politician of the Hungarian far-right movements. 
Given that the three men planned to overthrow the Bethlen Government, which they believed to be 
excessively liberal, pro-Entente and pro-Jewish, by force with the armed support of the German 
National Socialist movement led by Hitler and General Ludendorff, carrying out their plans at 
roughly the same time as the Beer Hall Putcsh, making their action dependent on its success, their 
coup plan is perhaps most aptly should be named the plan of the Hungarian Beer Hall Putsch. 
Ironically, the headquarters of the Association of Awakening Hungarians was located in Sörház 
Street – the name of which in English roughly means Beer Hall Street. 
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The preparations for the strange coup plan must have begun sometime in early August 
1923, when a young German man named Friedrich Fritz Döhmel appeared in Budapest, claiming 
to be a representative of the Hitler-Ludendorff-led Bavarian National Socialist movement and the 
closely allied paramilitary organisation Kampfbund, and approached several Hungarian far-right 
organizations and public figures with various seemingly credible German-language letters of 
recommendation. One of Döhmel’s first trips, whose motives were not entirely clear, was to the 
headquarters of the Association of Awakening Hungarians, which had previously maintained good 
relations with the Bavarian nationalists, where he wanted to meet members of the organizations 
leadership. He got to one of the associations leaders, Lieutenant Colonel PálPrónay, but Prónay 
did not believe the German young man’s claims. However, Döhmel did not give up, and he finally 
reached Titusz Bobula, a wealthy Hungarian-born architect who had returned from the United 
States of America and who held a confused radical right-wing perspective, and his friend, Dr. Béla 
Szemere, a medical doctor and hospital director, and his circle. Szemere, as the de facto 
commander of the above mentioned State Security Agents militia, which continued to operate with 
some intensity, and Bobula who provided financial support to the Hungarian far-right had been 
thinking for some time about how to remove the Bethlen Government, but their activities were 
limited to planning. It is not clear fom the available sources exactly when Döhmel contacted them, 
but it is likely that he was in contact with members of the radical right-wing association of the 
Hungarian Cultural League led by Szemere as early as August 1923.
6
 
It seems, however, that Döhmel approached Bobula who rented a suite in the Hotel Gellért 
at the end of October 1923, and Bobula almost immediately he called Szemere to him as well. 
This may not have been the first time that Szemere and Döhmel met, but in any case it was at this 
time that the Hungarian parties believed that Döhmel was indeed an agent of the Bavarian 
nationalist organisation, who was visiting Hungary to make concrete arrangements for cooperation 
with similar Hungarian far-right formations. Negotiations began in German, and Bobula translated 
what Döhmel said to Szemere who did not speak German. Döhmel asked how many people 
Szemere as former commander of the State Security Agents could call to arms in the event of a 
takeover attempt. Szemere replied that although the State Security Agents had not previously been 
set up for the purpose of conspiring against the state, there would certainly be some people willing 
to join the cause. There is also contradictory information about whether the majority of the 
members of the State Security Agents had previously surrendered their anti-riot service weapons, 
but it is certain that the Szemere were not backed by a serious armed force, and could have fielded 
at most only a few hundred men with handguns. Soon afterwards, the race-defending MP Dr. 
Ferenc Ulian was involved into the plotting, since he himself had long been in contact with 
Bavarian nationalist organizations, including a close acquaintance with Hitler, and he also gave 
credence to the claims made by Fritz Döhmel. On Döhmel’s initiative, the parties also drew up a 
treaty German on how the Bavarian state (which was to be established as an independent state that 
would separate from Germany) and the Hungarian state (which would be led by a new, radical 
right-wing government after the removal of the Bethlen Government) could cooperate in the 
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realization of their irredentist and anti-Semitic aims. The document was drafted in German by 
Döhmel himself and dealt with political, military and agricultural issues in eleven articles and 
three annexes. The essence of the document was that the newly created Bavarian state would 
recognize the newly created Hungarian state with its borders of 1914, before the beginning of the 
First World War and the signing of the Trianon Peace Treaty, and that the contracting states would 
do everything possible to help each other militarily.  In particular, they decided to send forces 
against the Little Entente Czechoslovakia and provide military assistance to each other if either 
Bavaria or Hungary were attacked by the Czechoslovakians. The treaty was signed on 5 
November by Szemere, Bobula and Ulain, and was scheduled to be signed in Munich by 
Ludendorff and Hitler on the German side. Ferenc Ulain otherwise knew exactly what was being 
prepared in Bavaria, how and especially when the the Bavarian far-right organizations, 
independently of Fritz Döhmel, and he envisaged the possible overthrow of the Hungarian 
Government in close coordination with the Munich beer coups. If Fritz Döhmel may have been an 
impostor/agent provocateur who may never previously have been in contact with Bavarian 
revolutionary organizations in the way he claimed to be a phantasmagorical Hungarian 
conspirator, Ulain’s previous negotiations and information may have told him certain things. It is 
therefore worth examining the Bavarian Beer Hall Putsch / Hitler-Ludendorff coup at least for a 
few sentences, so that we can place the activities of the Szemere-Bobula-Ulain group with all its 
absurdity and frivolity in international context. 
As Ulain later confessed before the State Police, he had already held talks with Hitler and 
Ludendorff in the summer of 1923. Bavaria which had a high degree of autonomy within the 
Weimar Republic as a federal state was at this time in a very turbulent political situation with a 
devastated economy and social discontent that favored extremist political formations. These 
included the NSDAP that is, the National Socialist German Workers Party, and its close allies, the 
paramilitary Kampfbund that mainly consisted of veterans. Political power was exercised by the 
former Bavarian Prime Minister Kahr who at the time was a Commissioner of the German Federal 
Government with provisory powers and had been given a mandate to solve the political and 
economic problems, together with Colonel Hans von Seisser, the commander of the Bavarian 
Police and General Otto von Lossow, the Reichswehr’s district commander in Bavaria. The 
representatives of the executive who exercised special powers to solve the crisis were 
ideologically not very far from the political extremists and the group led by Hitler and General 




Hitler and Ludendorff feared that although Bavaria had been taken over by nationalist 
politicians, they would be ignored. That is why in early November 1923 they organized a coup 
détat and tried to seize power by force. The so-called Beer Hall Putsch began in the 
Bürgerbräukeller, the Munich beer hall where Gustav von Kahr was addressing a speech to his 
supporters, and where Hitler and his armed men stormed in on the evening of 8 November and 
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declared the arrest of the politicians in power. To demonstrate the seriousness of the situation, the 
building was surrounded by some 600 armed SA-militiamen under the command of Captain Ersnt 
Röhm, and Commissioner Kahr, under the threat of armed force, assured Hitler and his men of his 
support. Hitler, a politician with truly outstanding oratory skills, made an incendiary speech at the 
same venue, and within moments had persuaded the thousands of people gathered in the beer hall 
to stand by his side. The National Socialist militia then mounted an operation to seize Munich’s 
main government buildings and public facilities, and later that night, Hitler and his men, believing 
they no longer needed Kahr and his associates, released the Commissioner.
8
 
The Nazi Party’s free troops were rioting on the streets, but the coup attempt had the very 
serious shortcoming that the police did not stand by and support the Nazis at all. On the following 
morning, 9 November, Hitler and his gunmen took the Bavarian Provincial Government hostage, 
and at the suggestion of General Ludendorff a march of 2,000 men set out to occupy the building 
of the Bavarian Ministry of Defence, but at the Odeonplatz in Munich Hitler and his militiamen 
were confronted by the armed forces loyal to Gustav von Kahz and the Federal Government, and a 
gunfight broke out. Sixteen coup fighters and four policemen were fatally wounded in the clash, 
and Hitler and the coup leaders fled the scene. It was here that it became clear that the coup 
attempt miserably failed, and Hitler was arrested by the police within a few days.
9
 
The future German dictator was eventually sentenced to five years in prison for treason, 
while General Ludendorff, a great and highly respected hero of the First World War, was acquitted 
of all charges despite his leading role in the Beer Hall Putsch. Partly thanks to his growing 
popularity, Hitler himself spent only nine months in prison and wrote his memoirs Mein Kampf – 
My Struggle. The attempted coup made Hitler a nation widely renowned and popular politician in 
the longer term, and ten years later, in 1933 he was constitutionally elected Chancellor of 
Germany, but soon became a bloodthirsty dictator.
10
 
Although the Bavarian beer coup, just like the Hungarian beer coup which had a much less 
serious background and was essentially devoid of armed forces, miserably failed, both – probably 
closely related – far-right political actions already pointed out in the first half of the 1920s, what 
crises and traumas that were at work in the societies of the states that had lost the First World War, 
and foreshadowed the subsequent, seemingly unstoppable rise of political extremism in the 1930s. 
As for the Hungarian putschists, Ferenc Ulain left by train on the eve of the Munich beer 
coup as planned, but never made it to Munich, so he was unable to meet the Bavarian nationalist 
politicians who were preparing for the beer coup. At Hegyeshalom, on the Austro-Hungarian 
border, he was stopped by the police, told that the Hungarian authorities were aware of the plot 
and confiscated the documents addressed to. Ulain was not detained on the grounds of his 
immunity as a member of the Parliament, but was kindly asked to visit the Budapest police the 
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next day, where he was already arrested. Shortly afterwards, Dr.BélaSzemere and TituszBobula 
were also detained by the detectives. 
It became clear to the Hungarian conspirators that the coup plan had not escaped the 
attention of the police, and archival sources make it clear that the authorities had been monitoring 
the group’s activities for weeks when Ulain travelled to Munich. As already mentioned, Fritz 
Döhmel appeared in Budapest in August 1923 as a lobbyist for the Bavarian-German National 
Socialist organisation. The details of his stay in Budapest between August and October are 
unclear, but it seems certain that he was not the only representative of the Bavarian National 
Socialists in Budapest at this time. In fact, in the autumn of 1923, the police arrested no fewer than 
fifty-seven young German men in the Hungarian capital who, as agents of the Hitler-Ludendorff-
led organisation had letters of recommendation addressed to the Association of Awakening 
Hungarians. Several of these German lobbyists were arrested and expelled from Hungary.  
Szemere, Bobula and Ulain were eventually suspected and charged with forming an 
alliance to incite rebellion. The case of MP Ferenc Ulain’s immunity was discussed also by the 
Parliaments Committee on Immunity in the last days of November 1923, and a thorough 
investigation was carried out. The race-defending MPs led by Gyula Gömbös sought to excuse 
Ulain and his associates and emphasized their opinion that Ulain and his associates were victims 
of an agent provocateur hired by the police, and they made accusations primarily against the 
bourgeois liberal representative whose aim, they claimed, was to openly discredit the race-
defending politicians. On 24 January 1924, the Royal Criminal Court of Budapest conceived the 
first-instance verdict in the case, sentencing all three defendants to one month and fourteen days in 
prison. The defendants were released in December 1923 and their sentences were deemed to have 
been completed in arrest. They exercised their right of appeal, and they were acquitted by the court 
of appeal shortly afterwards.
11
 
Although Béla Szemere, Titusz Bobula and Ferenc Ulain were eventually found innocent 
by the Hungarian Supreme Court even of the relatively mild charge of forming an alliance to 
rebel, the coup attempt they planned with Bavarian-German collaboration was undoubtedly 
frivolous precisely because it was no more than a mere plot, but it caused a major political scandal 
in 1923-1924. Furthermore, it raises many questions up to this day. The largest question mark is, 
of course, the identity and motives of Fritz Döhmel, the young German man who approached the 
coup plotters and tricked them into it, presumably to mislead everyone. The historical literature on 
the Szemere-Bobula-Ulain conspiracy is generally of the opinion that Fritz Döhmel was probably 
nothing more than an agent provocateur hired by the Bethlen Government to use him to discredit 
and politically isolate GyulaGömbös’s far-right race-defending group of MPs that left the 
governing party,
12
 or historians are content with the even simpler explanation that Döhmel was in 
fact an agent of Hitler and his associates and that there was some real connection between the 




 Lajos Serfőző, A titkostársaságokés a konszolidáció 1922–1926-ban, Acta Universitatis Szegediensis de Attila 
József Nominatae. Acta Historica, Tomus LVII, 1976, 3–60, 17–27.; Prónay, op. cit. 210. 
 
  Page | 38 
Anglisticum Journal (IJLLIS), Volume: 10 | Issue: 6 |                           
 June 2021  e-ISSN: 1857-8187  p-ISSN: 1857-8179 
German and Hungarian far-right organizations
13
 Even in the international literature, the Hungarian 
beer coup appears at the level of mention, and academic works written in foreign languages 
usually treat it as a fait accompli that there was a cooperation agreement between the Hungarian 
and German sides.
14
 Döhmel is referred to in various works as a diplomat, and agent, a swindler, 
an international adventurer and an agent provocateur, but since the works that mention the coup 
plan at all mostly do not discuss the Hungarian Beer Hall Putsch in any great detail, nor do they 
really refer to its archival sources, they do not shed light on the apparent contradictions. It is 
undoubtedly true that Ferenc Ulain and the race-defending faction of MPs leaving the governing 
United Party which not much later became a party itself caused relative inconvenience to the 
Bethlen Government which was working on consolidation by the disclosure of numerous 
corruption cases connected to the Government. Ulain himself had interpellated in the Parliament 
on several occasions on various corruption cases, thereby discrediting Bethlen’s Government.
15
 
Some senior government officials including Interior Minister Iván Rakovszky were bribed 
with free shares, and several state officials appeared to be implicated in the corruption case.
16
 In 
the summer of 1923, the Hungarian General Credit Bank granted gift shares to several government 
and opposition MPs for a total of about 300 million koronas, and they also seriously violated 
speculation rules.
17
 Even under pressure from the ruling party, Justice Minister Emil Nagy refused 
to cover up the case and ordered the Prosecutors Office under his ministry to launch a serious 
investigation. This case was partly responsible for his resignation from the Ministry of Justice 
shortly afterwards in 1924, and his relations with Prime Minister Bethlen also deteriorated. Ulain 
personally had a great deal to do with the breakout of one of the biggest corruption scandals of the 
Horthy Era, which did not directly cause a government crisis, but discredited the Bethlen 
Government to some degree and led to a major press campaign against it. It may have been 
Bethlen’s interest to discredit the race-defending MPs led by Gömbös, including UlainFerenc, but 
based on the archival sources it is doubtful that Döhmel was simply an agent provocateur hired by 
the Hungarian Government for this purpose, and nothing more. 
If we look closely at the testimony of ImreHetényi, the deputy police commissioner 
investigating the case, the report sent to the Budapest police commissioner and the testimony of 
Detective Inspector Jenő Seibold, it becomes clear that Fritz Döhmel was probably in Budapest 
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and was seeking contacts with Hungarian far-right organisations as a representative of Hitler’s 
Bavarian nationalist movement before his activities came to the attention of the police. Döhmel 
did indeed become an agent of the Hungarian political police for a short time, as Döhmel and 
Hetényi confessed the same. Döhmel reported to the authorities and some members of the 
Government on the activities of the conspirators, mainly in the hope of gaining financial benefits, 
but initially he seems to have sought contact with them independently, without the knowledge or 
involvement of the Hungarian authorities. There are also indications that Döhmel was indeed 
acting as an agent of the German radical right-wing political forces, but that he had already 
reported to the German state authorities in August 1923 that the Bavarian radical right was 
preparing to enter into serious international cooperation with its Hungarian counterparts.
18
 
We may ask the question whether it is possible that a strange situation could have arisen in 
which the political investigative department of the Hungarian police and Iván Rakovszky, the 
Minister of the Interior would have recruited a person who was apparently a native German 
speaker to act as a mole for the conspirators, by the authorities conspiratorially pretended that they 
had only learned of his activities later, after Döhmel had already incited the Szemere-Bobula-
Ulain group, which really wanted to overthrow the Government, to some degree of action. Would 
the police have conspiratorially produced documents largely for internal use which prove that 
Döhmel had initially acted independently of them and only later cooperated with the authorities, 
even though he had been a hired provocateur for the state authorities from the beginning? The 
answer is, of course, this is possible, but hardly likely or realistic. 
It is also possible that Fritz Döhmel may have been recruited by another Hungarian state 
agency, at the highest order of the Bethlen Government, and in the greatest secrecy, for example 
by the military secret service, the Department 2 of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence, 
which was operating under secrecy at the time because of the restrictions  of armament on 
Hungary, to discredit Ferenc Ulain and his associates with a conspiracy that he himself had 
practically incited them to pursue, but the likelihood of this is also very small. The idea sounds 
impossible and irrational because, if the sources are to be believed, Döhmel originally approached 
Béla Szemere and Titusz Bobula who were indeed thinking about the possibility of overthrowing 
the Government completely independently of Döhmel, and Ulain as an MP with some political 
influence and a person with real links to Bavarian nationalist circles was only involved in the 
conspiracy somewhat later. That is, when Döhmel contacted Szemere and Bobula, there is a good 
chance that he did not know that Ferenc Ulain would soon become a key figure in the conspiracy. 
In fact, it seems that Döhmel was not originally the agent of the Hungarian Government, but acted 
independently, it is not known exactly on whose behalf, and only later did he start reporting to the 
political police. 
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It is also possible that Fritz Döhmel was originally an agent of the Bavarian nationalist 
organizations – it seems the most likely scenario –, but later he became self-employed man and 
literally sold out the conspiracy and the information he possessed, primarily for financial gain, 
while at the same time, he was trying to magnify the activities of the conspirators to suit his own 
interests. The contradictions in his repeated testimonies, the almost laughable elements in which 
he said, for example, that although he was originally linked to the German far-right, but as for his 
political beliefs he were in fact an idealistic communist and philo-Semite, and that he had exposed 
the radical right-wing conspirators in order to prevent the violent anti-Semitic acts they were 
allegedly planning also suggest that he may have been motivated by financial gain.
19
 On the other 
hand, he deliberately sought to create as a large scandal as possible and confuse everyone as much 
as possible.  
However, the first instance judgment of the Royal Criminal Court of Budapest conceives 
interestingly, saying that Döhmel’s identity is a mystery even to the Hungarian state authorities, 
and although it is likely that the circles behind him are to be sought abroad, they are certainly not 
in Bavaria, and Döhmel badly misled both the participants in the Hungarian Beer Hall Putsch and 
the Hungarian authorities.
20
 Abroad but not in Bavaria could also mean – although we do not have 
to agree with the criminal court in the absence of written evidence – that the mysterious young 
man in question was an agent of the secret services of a foreign state who was instructed to try to 
sabotage the attempts of cooperation between German and Hungarian far-right organizations and 
to discredit them in the eyes of each other. 
If we allow ourselves to speculate, we could ask the logical question of which state or 
states had an interest in preventing the emerging German far-right organizations from building 
international links during this period. The answer is obvious: France, Austria, or even the Weimar 
Republic itself. Indeed, in the relatively recent past, in 2009, a French intelligence report was 
discovered in the custody of the National Archives of France and received some press coverage 
according to which the French intelligence service had been monitoring the emerging National 
Socialist leader and his circle, and which painted Hitler as a politician with the oratorical qualities 
and charisma similar to that of Mussolini.
21
 The same could also be true of the neighboring Little 
Entente states which also clearly did not want Hungarian political forces to have serious foreign 
allies for the revisionist ambitions, so they cannot be excluded from such assumptions either. 
Furthermore, there was also Austria there that had newly become and independent and as 
one of the successor states to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was struggling with serious domestic 
political and economic problems. The crisis after the loss of the First World War provided an 
excellent breeding ground for political extremism here as well, and the Government faced the real 
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danger that Germany would eventually annex Austria in order to restore the unity of Germany, as 
the National Socialist German Regime under Hitler really did it fifteen years later in 1938. 
National Socialist-style, pro-Anschluss movements had already made their appearance here early, 
and it was therefore not in the interest of the Austrian state that the Hitler-Ludendorff circle should 




Finally, there was the Republic of Weimar itself there, then under the leadership of 
President Friedrich Ebert and Federal Chancellor Gustav Stresemann, which, as the biggest loser 
of the First World War, was also struggling with huge economic and social crises as the empire 
was transformed from a monarchy into a republic. It was precisely these crises and the growing 
discontent that increased the popularity of demagogic politicians such as Hitler and the National 
Socialists who professed and promoted extremist ideas. It is certain that the secret services of the 
Weimar Republic had undercover agents in radical political movements, since it is a little known 
fact of Hitler’s life that he initially came into contact with National Socialism after the defeat of 
the short-lived Bavarian Soviet Republic in 1919 as an officer of the German army’s intelligence 
and propaganda unit in Bavaria. Hitler’s task was to gather information on organizations and 
individuals propagating political extremism and to carry out vigorous anti-communist propaganda. 
One such radical right-wing organisation monitored by the German military intelligence service 
was the then insignificant DAP (Deutsche Arbeiterpartei), the German Workers’ Party, which 
Hitler managed to infiltrate so well that he soon became its leader and, within a few years, had 
organized it into a nationwide political movement under the name NSDAP, the National Socialist 
German Workers Party. The predominantly liberal and social democratic Government of the 
Weimar Republic thus understandably had no interest that the National Socialist movement should 
build up significant international relations and fought against political extremism within Germany 
in much the same way as the consolidationist Bethlen Government did in the Hungarian context. 
There are also indications that Döhmel was in contact with the German state security services as 
early as August 1923, and that he reported to them that Bavarian and Hungarian far-right 
organizations were trying to re-establish contact and revive the cooperation that had been initiated 
earlier.
23
 It also seems certain that Döhmel was indeed originally in contact with Hitler and his 
circle, as a Hungarian detective had followed him to Bavaria on behalf of Deputy Police 
Commissioner Imre Hetényi and checked if Döhmel had really in connection with National 
Socialists. Although Hungarian historian István Németh has also published some German 
diplomatic documents in his extensive source publication in connection with the Ulain case as 
well, primarily from the correspondence between the Hungarian and German law enforcement and 
diplomatic services, these do not, of course, reveal the true identity of the key German figure in 
the conspiracy, Fritz Döhmel. All that is known is that in November 1923, Deputy Police 
Commissioner Hetényi informed the German embassy in Budapest that Döhmel had been under 
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surveillance by the Hungarian police for some time and that dozens of young German men were in 
Budapest to initiate a cooperation agreement between the Hungarian and German far-right 
organizations.
24
 The scarce German sources of the case reveal that Döhmel’s motives were not 
known to German state authorities, and mention that Gerhard Köpke, an official of the German 
Foreign Ministry (Auswärtiges Amt) wrote to the Imperial Commissioner for the Supervision of 
Public Order (Reichskomissarfür die Überwachung der Öffentlichen Ordnung) and asked 
information of him about the case.   A few days later, the Foreign Ministry sent a summary of the 
case to the representative of the German Federal Government in Munich, requesting further 
information, in particular on the links between Hungarian and German radical right-wing 
organizations. However, the German Imperial Commissioner for the Supervision Public Order, 
who was practically the head of the German federal political police service interestingly confused 
the issue even further by not providing the Foreign Ministry with any relevant information, and in 
his reply expressed the opinion that Fritz Döhmel had really no connection with the National 
Socialists, and, referring to a rather unreliable press source, the daily titled Germania of 25 
November 1923, claimed that he was in fact a Communist.
25
 Although this is all in the realm of 
conjecture, it cannot be excluded that Fritz Döhmel, among his other motives and activities, 
possibly in conjunction with his earlier actual National Socialist involvement, was an agent of the 
German secret service whose aim was to disrupt the activities of the National Socialists, especially 
their international relations, and that the German political police and secret services were therefore 
not interested in exposing his true identity. 
Although Hitler also issued a press statement in the Hungarian far-right newspaper called 
Szózat in which he categorically denied that Döhmel was his or his party’s agent, and all of this 
was also stressed by National Socialist leaders Alfred Rosenberg and Anton Drexler, this proves 
absolutely nothing.
26
 Hitler had just been arrested for an unsuccessful coup attempt, and he did not 
want to add to his already difficult situation by admitting that he would have wanted to carry out 
the Bavarian Beer Hall Putch with some international involvement if it had been possible or that 
he would have interfered in the internal affairs of another states if it had been successful. That is, 
Döhmel may well have been in contact with the Hitler-Ludendorff circle in some way, as his 
knowledge of the Bavarian domestic political situation and his ability to convince Ferenc Ulain 
who was indeed in contact with Hitler would suggest. Fritz Döhmel’s unusually high level of 
education and diplomatic skills may also be indicated by the fact that, according to the 
conspirators’ testimonies, he put his somewhat absurd but nevertheless professional draft treaty 
about the Bavarian-Hungarian political cooperation on paper without drafting. 
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While it is also possible that Döhmel was a simple swindler driven purely by the prospect 
of financial gain, his high-level disinformation activities with which he deceived the conspirators 
themselves as well as politicians and policemen may suggest an international intelligence game in 
the background. 
Of course, Fritz Döhmel’s true identity will probably never be completely known, even 
after almost a hundred years, so we can only rely on what seems to be logical theories. Whatever 
the truth about the Hungarian Beer Hall Putsch is, it is certain that, like the much more serious 
Bavarian Beer Hall Putsch, it failed from the very beginning. The White Internationale between 
the radical right-wing forces under General Ludendorff’s leadership did not come into being, and 
just as the German federal government succeeded in marginalizing the extreme right for a time, so 
by the end of 1923 the Bethlen Government had succeeded in isolating Gömbös and his circle in 
parliament and in marginalizing to some extent their political activities which were dangerous to 
consolidation. 
However, it is ironic and at the same time somewhat frightening that the representatives of 
the Hungarian far-right sought contact with the German politician who was not taken too seriously 
at the time, and was even considered ridiculous by many, and expected him to help them realize 
their own political legacy who less than twenty years later, became the most notorious, mass-
murdering dictator of the 20th century. It is perhaps an exaggeration to say such a thing, but 
nevertheless, the Hungarian Beer Hall Putsch, this attempted coup which at the time seemed so 
ridiculous somehow foreshadowed and predestined Hungary’s mournful political and military 
involvement in the 1940s and it’s becoming one of Nazi Germanys most loyal allies in the Second 
World War. Interestingly, on an individual level, the same could be said of the Hungarian leader 
of the 1923 conspiracy: Ferenc Ulain who began his political career in the United Party and later 
was the MP of the Race-defending and Peasant Parties, finally joined the Arrow Cross Party led 
by Ferenc Szálasi in the 1940s, which, in the final months of the war, staged a coup with German 
help and brought to power a pro-German puppet government, causing enormous losses to a 
country that had already evidently lost the war. 
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